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IN DEFENSE OF THE KALAM
COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
William Lane Craig

Graham Oppy's attempt to show that the critiques of the kalam cosmological argument offered by Griinbaum, Davies, and Hawking are successful is
predicated upon a misunderstanding of the nature of defeaters in rational
belief. Neither Grunbaum nor Oppy succeed in showing an incoherence in
the Christian doctrine of creation. Oppy's attempts to rehabilitate Davies's
critique founders on spurious counter-examples and unsubstantiated
claims. Oppy's defense of Hawking's critique fails to allay suspicions about
the reality of imaginary time and finally results in the denial of tense and
temporal becoming.

Introduction
Graham Oppy maintains that, despite my replies, the critiques of the
kalam cosmological argument offered by A. Griinbaum, P. Davies, and S.
Hawking succeed in showing that kalam arguments are not "rationally
compelling pieces of natural theology.'" The phrase is reminiscent of
Alvin Plantinga's disclaimer about the ontological argument. 2 Indeed,
like Plantinga, Oppy differentiates between an argument's being a successful piece of natural theology and an argument's being sound or
being rationally held to be sound. In order for the above-named critics
to succeed in showing that kalam arguments are not rationally compelling pieces of natural theology, all they must do is show "that there is
no good, non-question-begging reason for them to be persuaded that the
arguments ... are sound."3
These introductory comments by Oppy suggest that the issue before
us concerns the role of defeaters of prima facie warranted beliefs.' The
kalam cosmological argument is an exercise in positive apologetics aimed
at proving that God exists. It may be formulated as follows:
1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.
Conceptual analysis of what it is to be cause of the universe will recover
several of the principal attributes of God, so that the cause takes on the
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character of a personal Creator of the universe.
In order to remove the warrant provided by the argument for its conclusion, the argument's detractor must either expose a fallacy in its logical inference form or defeat at least one of its premises. Refutatory
defeaters brought against the premises may be either rebutting defeaters
which aim to show that the relevant premiss is false or undercutting
defeaters which aim to show that the relevant premise has not been
proved to be true. Oppy's contention seems to be that the critics of the
kalam cosmological argument have at least succeeded in providing
undercutting defeaters of its premises and that therefore the argument,
even if sound, is not successful in proving God's existence.
If this is in fact the issue, then the question will be the comparative
warrant enjoyed by the premises and their respective defeaters. If the
premiss is more strongly warranted than its ostensible defeater, then any
informed and rational person will, ceteris paribus, accept the soundness
of the argument. The argument's defender will typically seek to
decrease the defeater's warrant by defeating it, either rebutting or
undercutting it, thereby increasing the relative warrant of the premiss
under attack. The question at hand, then, will be whether the defeaterdefeaters I offered in answer to the above-named critics succeed in refuting their proffered defeaters.
This seems, as I say, to be the issue; but upon arriving at a postscript
appended to Oppy's article, the reader discovers that for Oppy this is
not at all the issue. Just as George Mavrodes criticized Plantinga for
being overly stringent about what passes as a successful piece of natural
theology,s so an anonymous referee complained that Oppy is demanding too much of the kalam argument if it must be such that no informed
person who understands its premises and sees its logical validity will
reject its conclusion." In the face of this criticism, Oppy revises his claim:
he now charges that the kalam argument is not "provisionally rationally
compelling for its intended audience."7 Oppy explains this notion as
follows:
A. If an argument is logically compelling and proceeds from

premises to which the intended audience is committed, it is provisionally rationally compelling for its intended audience.
An argument which meets this condition is deemed "a success," for it
"forces one's opponent either to accept one's conclusion ... or to revise
other beliefs."8 Oppy charges that the kalam argument is not even provisionally rationally compelling for its intended audience (namely, presumptively reasonable agnostics and atheists) because it relies on "physical and metaphysical theses which members of the target audience
reject.""
Now at face value, Oppy's argument is invalid because (A) states
only a sufficient, not a necessary, condition of an argument's being provisionally rationally compelling for its intended audience. A defender
of the kalam argument might well maintain that his argument has this
character because it is logically compelling and proceeds from premises
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which its intended audience ought to accept (even if they do not) or from
premises which are warranted for its intended audience (that is, are such
that the audience will accept them if their cognitive faculties are functioning properly). Oppy probably intended (A) to be stated in terms of
necessary and sufficient conditions:
A*. An argument is provisionally rationally compelling for its
intended audience if and only if it is logically compelling and
proceeds from premises to which the intended audience is committed.
But the kalam proponent might well reject (A*), as I have suggested.
Perhaps a member of the audience, like some Soviet philosophers I
heard at the World Congress on Philosophy in 1978, stubbornly rejects
the premiss that the universe began to exist in defiance of and without any
counter-explanation of the evidence simply out of a faith commitment to
dialectical materialism. He has no adequately warranted defeater of the
kalam proponent's evidence for the truth of that premiss; is the kalam
argument not therefore rationally compelling with respect to him?
Oppy thinks not; he says, "Once the conditions for debate-including
the possession of respect for one's opponents-break down, questions
about dialectical success or failure become nugatory."IO Perhaps Oppy's
point is that one's intended audience must be "presumptively reasonable," so that once that presumption fails, an argument cannot be provisionally rationally compelling for them. But clearly one may regard
one's audience as generally reasonable, even if in the case of premises
implying theism they believe irrationally. If they are generally reasonable people" but refuse to believe some of one's premises despite their
want of a suitable defeater, then it seems to me that one can legitimately
claim "dialectical success." Dialectical success cannot be equated with
convincing one's opponent (or even forcing him to revise his beliefs);
after all, many will simply refuse to be convinced. All sorts of psychological and spiritual factors come into play here for which a philosopher
cannot be held responsible. Dialectical success in natural theology cannot, then, be measured merely in terms of success in convincing unbelievers. Christian apologist E. J. Carnell pointed out that one of the purposes of apologetics is to remove from the unbeliever any just excuse for
his not repenting before Cod. l1 That objective is achieved so long as the
unbeliever is presented sound theistic arguments with substantiated
premises for which he has no adequately warranted defeater, even if he
refuses to believe those premises.
But suppose we accept (A*). Does the kalam argument fail to meet its
conditions? This is far from obvious. Atheism does not imply the contradictory of either of the argumenfs premises taken separately. The
unbeliever may simply have never realized the implication of the conjunction of these premises. Presented with the argument, he may be
persuaded to become a theist. Or again, he may not accept one of the
premises, but if the theist can furnish him an argument for that premiss
based on propositions he accepts or if the theist can furnish a defeater
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for the defeater which the unbeliever has brought against the premiss,
then the non-theist may change his mind and come to accept the premiss. Is this mere speculation on my part? Not at all; 1 (and others)
have seen atheists and agnostics change their minds when presented
with the kalam cosmological argument and become theistsY Thus, hard
empirical evidence refutes Oppy's claim that the kalam cosmological
argument is a dialectical failure.
But suppose Oppy were correct. Of what philosophical significance
is his conclusion that the kalam argument is not provisionally rationally
compelling for its intended audience? None at all, so far as 1 can see.
The argument may still be sound and provide warrant for theistic belief.
It would just not be very useful in evangelism. Perhaps Oppy's conclusion has the practical implication that the Church should not waste her
time and resources holding training sessions on how to use the kalam
cosmological argument to win souls. That would be an important lesson
in stewardship and missions for which we might thank Oppy; but it is
not a conclusion of interest to philosophers.
What all this suggests is that the real issue raised by our trio of critics
is the question as 1 originally framed it: whether their defeaters are successful against the kalam argument or whether these defeaters are not
themselves refuted at a higher level by the defeater-defeaters 1 offered.
In answering this question, we should do well to keep in mind the difference between undercutting defeaters and rebutting defeaters. Part of
my complaint against these critics is that their proffered defeaters frequently do not so much as even take into account, much less refute,
alternative positions compatible with theism, so that the theist can easily
undercut these defeaters by merely mentioning such alternatives. Thus,
Oppy errs when he advises, "one has two options: one can give up on
the argument; or one can seek to construct arguments for the contentious premises."13 The defender of the kalam argument need not come
up with new arguments for a disputed premiss if he can simply undercut the defeater offered by the critic. In that case, it is now up to the critic to provide at a higher level a defeater of the defeater-defeater.
A. Griinbaum's Critique
The above strategy will become clearer as we look at specific examples. Consider first Grunbaum's familiar argument that the universe
cannot have a cause because a cause must precede its effect temporally,
which is impossible if space-time began to exist. This defeater attempts
to show that the conclusion of the kalam argument that the universe has a
cause is incoherent; it is thus, pace Oppy, an attack on the soundness of
the argument and, indeed, of Christian theism itself. Now in response to
this defeater, I offered three different accounts of how God could be
causally related to the universe's origin," including the hypothesis that
cause and effect are in this case simultaneous. 1 observed that simultaneous causation is routinely discussed in analyses of causation and that
it is intuitively applicable to the case of creation. All Grunbaum says
about this alternative is the single sentence:: "I consider the notion of
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simultaneous causation, as applied to the purported creation of time,
either unintelligible or, at best, incoherent.// 13 But he gives no reason at
all for this opinion, and, as I commented, until he does so, his remark is
purely autobiographical and fails to refute my undercutting defeater.!6
It is not up to the theist to prove that simultaneous causation is intelligible and coherent; it is up to the critic to show that it is not. When the
critic does corne up with some reason, then the theist must undercut or
rebut it, if he wants to retain rationally the proposed alternative. (In
fact, I anticipated a possible objection to simultaneous causation which
Grunbaum might raise and pre-emptively undercut it.!7) But until the
critic shows some incoherence in the proposed alternative, the Christian
theist's claim that God caused the origin of the universe has not been
shown to be incoherent and so remains undefeated, even if the critic
does not accept the theist's proposed alternative. Thus, Oppy is wrong
when he asserts that the kalam theorist needs to show to non-theists that
"it is metaphysically possible that the universe was instantaneously created by a supernatural agent."!S Au contraire, all the theist need do to
defeat the proffered defeater is prove that this notion has not been
proven to be impossible.
Does Oppy, then, advance the debate by showing some incoherence
in simultaneous creation? Not significantly; he just asserts that "it seems
plausible to think that the creative actions of rational agents require
lapses of time between the formation of appropriate intentions and the
carrying out of those intentions.// 19 Again, this single sentence does not
constitute much of an argument. But to consider it at face value: notice
that the objection says nothing against the notion of simultaneous causation, which posits no lapse between an exercise of causal power and the
production of the effect. Oppy speaks rather of a lapse between the formation of an intention to cause and the exercise of causal power. The
objection is that temporally prior to God's (simultaneously) causing the
Big Bang, He would have to form an intention to do so, which is impossible. But Oppy's operative principle is doubly inapplicable to God. For
an omniscient being like God, there can be no such lapse, since God does
not need to make up His mind about what He is going to do. 20 And if
God is timeless sans creation, then He has a timeless intention to create a
temporal world, in which case there can be no lapse. 2 ! To carry his
defeater, Oppy needs to show that the doctrines of divine omniscience
and timelessness are incoherent. Until he provides such arguments, his
defeater remains undercut.
In sum, neither Grunbaum nor Oppy succeed in showing that the
conclusion of the kalam cosmological argument is incoherent. I do not
pretend that the doctrine of creation does not involve many subtle and
difficult questions; but precisely for that reason it cannot be defeated by
easy one-liners such as Grunbaum and Oppy offer.22
P. Davies's Critique
Turn, then, to Oppy's defense of Davies's critique of the kalam cosmological argument. Taking his cue from Davies, Oppy attempts to refute
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the causal premiss that whatever begins to exist has a cause by appeal to the
production of virtual particles in the quantum mechanical vacuum.23
Wholly apart from the disputed question of whether virtual particles
really exist at all,24 the central point to be made here is that the quantum
mechanical vacuum on which they depend for their existence is emphatically not nothing. The dynamical properties of vacuous space arise out
of its interaction with matter and radiation fields, in the absence of
which "this dynamism of empty space is but a formal abstraction lacking physical reality."25 The quantum vacuum is a sea of fluctuating energy which gives rise to virtual particles. Thus, virtual particles can hardly be said to arise without a cause.
Oppy apparently thinks that cosmological models in which the universe originates via a spontaneous fluctuation from the primordial vacuum are distinct from models in which the universe does not violate the
mass-energy conservation law because the sum total of its positive and
negative energy is zero. But this is just confused: these are the same
models, all presupposing the existence of the quantum mechanical vacuum which spawns the universe. 26 Thus, these models do not subvert the
causal premiss. Moreover, while these models merited scientific discussion when Davies wrote God and the New Physics back in the early
1980's, they are today widely rejected and no longer at the center of
interest. 27
Oppy is willing to engage in metaphysical speculations in order to
defeat the kalam argument's second premiss that the universe began to
exist. He suggests,
one might take the universe to be a distribution of properties
across an at-Ieast-four-dimensional manifold, and also hold that
time is merely a local phenomenon-i.e. that none of the dimensions of the manifold is essentially temporal. Those parts of the
manifold which are non-temporal might be able to provide an
explanation of the origins of the temporal parts. 28
It is difficult to know what to make of this extremely obscure sugges-

tion; but the best sense I can make of it would be to take it as a description of the Hartle-Hawking model in which time is imaginary prior to
the Planck time and so indistinguishable from space. Since this model is
more properly the province of our next critic rather than of Davies, I
shall reserve comment until we consider Oppy's defense of Hawking's
critique.
Finally, Oppy charges that my defeater-defeaters in defense of the
second premiss often involve objection to critics' gratuitous reification or
hypostatization of theoretical constructs but that it is not clear that one
can get a suitably grounded commitment to the reality of the initial
space-time singularity unless one also takes on the same ontological
commitments. But since Oppy gives no examples or explanation of how
this is the case, I must confess that I find the charge quite puzzling. The
standard Friedman cosmology does not commit one to space-time substantivalism, four (or more) dimensionalism, the Many Worlds
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model. Such a model could be of great utility to science, but it would
not, as Hawking boldly asserts, eliminate the need for a Creator.
Oppy does not seek so much to defend a realist construal of
Hawking's model as to claim that the model does not involve such realist commitments. Whether Hawking's claim to eliminate the need for a
Creator implies a commitment to realism concerning superspace and
sum-over-histories is, I think, a moot point/2 but the realistic construal of
imaginary time is essential to Hawking's claim. For it is this feature of
the model that eliminates the initial singularity by spatializing time, so
that space-time as we know it originates in a timelessly existing fourspace. It is because time is imaginary that the points along that dimension prior to the Planck time are not related by the earlier/later than relations, so that the point which marks the beginning of the universe in real
time is not prior to other points in imaginary time. Absent this feature
of the modet the point which is the "South Pole" of the four-dimensional hemisphere prior to the Planck time would be the beginning of the
universe, which Hawking wants to avoid. Thus, contrary to Oppy, the
whole dispute hangs on a realistic interpretation of the geometry of
space-time according to which time is an imaginary quantity prior to the
Planck time.
Oppy finds as absurd as I do Hawking's suggestion that real time is
illusory and imaginary time is ontologically real; but he proposes to reformulate Hawking's position to make it more palatable. Oppyadvises,
What he ought to say is that what we call 'real time' is not a
physically fundamental property of the universe; i.e. from the
standpoint of basic physical description, what we call 'real time'
has the same status as 'potable water' or 'visible light.' Of
course, contra Hawking this is not to impugn the reality of real
time-and [sic] nor is it to impugn the reality of the singularities
in real time-though it will, I think, require the insistence that
real time is merely a local feature of the universe. Since, on this
view, the singularities in real time are properly contained in the
real universe, one can be a realist about them without giving up
the idea that the universe has no boundaries. 33
I take it that the scenario described here is the same as that adumbrated
in the quotation in the previous section on Davies's critique.
Unfortunately, what Oppy says here is most obscure. Hawking would
agree with the first clause in the above quotation. Oppy's gloss on this
seems to be that having assignable values restricted to the set of the real
numbers is a contingent property of measurements of time or (from the
earlier quotation) of that dimension which is time. Where he differs
from Hawking is that he does not go so far as to deny that real numbers
are associated with the correct measures of some intervals of time. But
this show of reserve does nothing to meet the objections I lodged against
imaginary time, namely, its physical unintelligibility and its metaphysical incoherence. These difficulties are so severe that my atheist collaborator Quentin Smith felt compelled to interpret Hawking's imaginary
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Interpretation of quantum physics, superspace, realism about sum-overhistories interpretation of quantum theory, and so on. The fact of the
initial cosmological singularity is guaranteed by the General Theory of
Relativity coupled with the Hawking-Penrose singularity theorems. No
ontological commitments are required beyond the very general conditions laid down by that theory and those theorems. 2" So Oppy has to do
much more than he has in order to carry his defeater that the standard
Big Bang model makes the same ontological commitments as its exotic
competitors.
Once again, then, we find that Oppy has failed to refute my defeaters
of Davies's critique. He attempts to offer rebutting defeaters of the first
premiss by supplying counter-examples, but these alleged counterexamples turn out upon examination to be spurious. With respect to the
second premiss, he tries a tu quoque argument to undercut my charge of
gratuitous hypostatization on the part of the argument's critics, but fails
to substantiate his charge with specifics. Thus, my defeater-defeaters
remain intact.
S. Hawking's Critique

Finally, we come to Hawking's attempt to defeat the premiss that the
universe began to exist by his quantum gravity cosmological model.
Oppy has far too generous an assessment of the Hartle-Hawking
modepo Far from being physically plausible, it does not seem to be even
physically intelligible, relying as it does on imaginary time. And far
from being consistent with the evidence, the model may not even be
mathematically consistent and in fact fails in its attempt to predict a
unique wave function of the universe. 31 For this reason the model has
generated virtually no following among cosmologists despite its being
trumpeted in the popular media.
My principal complaint against Hawking's model was that it cannot
be construed as a realistic description of the origin of the universe
because of its dubious metaphysical presuppositions. I have no objection to treating Hawking's model instrumentally as a description of a
universe with a beginning using the formalism of quantum mechanics,
in which the beginning is suppressed. One might consider profitably
the analogy of the use of imaginary numbers for the time coordinate in
the metric of Minkowski space-time, a mathematical trick which suppresses the curvature in space-time and so allows one to treat a pseudoEuclidean four-space as a Euclidean four-space. Space-time itself, as an
(ex hypothesi) objectively existing reality, is not changed by this redescription. It is still a pseudo-Euclidean four-space, but we can treat it
as if it were Euclidean by using imaginary numbers for the time coordinate. The only change that occurs is on paper. In a similar way,
Hawking's use of imaginary numbers for the time variable allows one to
redescribe a universe with an initial cosmological singularity in such a
way that that point appears as a non-singular point on a curved hypersurface. Such a re-description suppresses and literally spatializes time
as well, which makes evident the purely instrumental character of the
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regime instrumentally and to maintain that classical space-time popped
into being out of nothing at the Planck time!34
Oppy's claim that his interpretation does not impugn the reality of
the singularities in real time is baffling, since imaginary time is invoked
precisely to eliminate the cosmological singularities. If one is a realist
about the singularities, then, pace Oppy, they do constitute boundaries to
the universe-this is the case even for singularities formed in black holes
during the real time regime. Oppy later interprets his envisioned scenario as "embedding the space which contains the singularity in a more
extensive, appropriately contoured, manifold."35 Since singularities are
singular points in space-time, not space, what Oppy seems to envision is
that our four-dimensional space-time is embedded in a sort of hyperspace-time. This metaphysical speculation is not analogous to physical
theories which suggest that our space-time may involve additional
(compacted) dimensions. Oppy's idea is that our space-time is fourdimensional, but that there exists a sort of hyper-time and hyper-space
in which our space-time exists. How this idea connects with time's
being only contingently real is unclear. My best guess is that Oppy conceives hyper-space-time to involve imaginary time, and our space-time
with its real time and real singularities is embedded in it as in a static
space. It is evident that this scenario bears no resemblance to Hawking's
model universe. It is also evident that it does nothing to answer my
objections to imaginary time, but only pushes the problem back a notch.
Finally, the hypothesis succumbs to the same objection which I lodged
against Brian Leftow's theory of the existence of temporal entities in
eternity (which remarkably parallels Oppy's hypothesis as I have interpreted it), namely, it is impossible to preserve the reality of tense and
temporal becoming once time is embedded in a timeless hyper-dimension. 36 I am far more confident of the reality of tense and temporal
becoming than I am of the existence of Oppy's hyper-space-time. In fact,
here again we see the incredible lengths to which non-theists will go in
order to avoid the existence of a Creator. Apart from an aversion to theism, there is absolutely no reason to adopt a hypothesis so speculative,
so obscure, and so sterile as Oppy's.

Concluding Remarks
Oppy's central failure in his critique of the kalam cosmological argument is his misunderstanding of the defeater-structure of rationality. He
does not sufficiently appreciate that one may undercut purported
defeaters by showing that the defeaters lack appropriate warrant. The
ball is then in the critic's court; he is called upon to supply the warrant
for his defeater. Oppy shirks this task, being content with the mere
assertion that non-theists do not accept the theist's defeater-defeaters.
Specifically, Griinbaum, Davies, and Hawking all make serious allegations against the premises and conclusion of the kalam cosmological
argument without adequately supporting their defeaters in light of my
defeater-defeaters, and Oppy fails to redress the situation. The kalam
argument thus emerges from the fray unscathed.
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